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L.E v WEISAINAND THE MAJORITARIAN IMPLICATIONS OF
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitu-
tion provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion."' In recent years, the Court has consistently applied the
three prong test from Lemon v. Kurtzman2 to determine whether a certain
government action violates the Clause. In 1992, however, the Court devi-
ated from these set principles in Lee v. Weisman.3 The Court, while admit-
ting that Establishment Clause analysis is fact-specific, 4 seemingly
abandoned the three-prong Lemon test and adopted a new coercion
standard.
5
The Court found that an invocation and benediction at a high school
graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause. By using a
stricter coercion test, however, the Court made violations of the Establish-
ment Clause more difficult to prove. Therefore, governmental actions
that would not pass muster under more reasonable tests are now valid sim-
ply because they lack a coercive element.
This Note examines the recent decision in Lee.6 Part I explores the
background of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and addresses the con-
flict between the First and Sixth Circuits on the proper application of the
Clause to prayer at high school graduation ceremonies. Part I1 discusses
the facts of Lee and the reasoning underlying the Court's decision. Part III
analyzes the case and addresses the future implications of the decision in
light of recent federal circuit and district court cases. The Note concludes
that the Court's adoption of a coercion standard fails to give the broad
protection the Establishment Clause meant to provide. By not aggressively
enforcing the Clause, the Court furthers majoritarian tyranny and aban-
dons its role as protector of minority interests.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Framers' Intent
The Supreme Court has considered analysis of the history of the Con-
stitution to be essential to a proper understanding of the two religion
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test provides that "[flirst, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion." Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
3. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
4. Id. at 2661.
5. See id. at 2655.
6. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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clauses-the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 7 Histori-
cal considerations have led the Court to assume the role of Constitutional
historian.8 While this type of inquiry is not determinative, 9 because the
Framers could not have foreseen many of today's problems,1 0 it does give
a general understanding of the intent behind the Establishment Clause.
This understanding helps formulate a proper application of the Clause to
today's issues.
Three general philosophies surrounded the enactment of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment.1 1 The first view, associated with
Roger Williams, was the evangelical view. 12 This view believed that
"worldly corruptions . ..might consume the churches if sturdy fences
against the wilderness were not maintained."1 3 The second view, promul-
gated by Thomas Jefferson, argued that the church should be separated
from the state to protect secular interests "against ecclesiastical depreda-
tions and incursions.1 4 The third view, advanced by James Madison,
urged that both religion and the state would be furthered if religious
power were decentralized so as to avoid domination of one religion over
another.15
Roger Williams saw the religion clauses as a means to protect the
church. Jefferson, however, argued the clauses were to protect the state.
He demanded that there be a "wall of separation between church and
state.' 6 Madison believed that both religion and the state could better
flourish if each were free to pursue its own goals without the other's en-
croaching influence.1 7 To achieve this end Madison argued that religion
and government would best be protected from each other "by an entire
abstinence [sic] of the Government from interference [with religion] in any
way whatever."
18
While these views seem to overlap in some areas, the Supreme Court
has distilled these philosophies into three generally accepted conclu-
sions.' 9 First, historical inquiry is relevant in determining the meaning of
7. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge,J., dissenting) (recogniz-
ing that "[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its
generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment").
8. For a general discussion of the Court's use of history see CHARLES A. MILLER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
9. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan,J., concurring) (assert-
ing that "too literal a quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers" is usually inconclusive).
10. Id. at 237-38.
11. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 816 (1st ed. 1978).
12. Id.; see also MARK DEWoLFE HoWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965) (dis-
cussing Roger Williams' view of separation between church and state).
13. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 816; HowE, supra note 12, at 6.
14. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 816; HowE, supra note 12, at 2.
15. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 816; see also Robert C. Casad, The Establishment Clause
and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICH. L. REv. 419, 421 (1964) (discussing Madison's view that
the first amendment was designed to "promote a multiplicity of sects").
16. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
17. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 817.
18. Id.; IX THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 487 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
19. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 817.
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the religion clauses; second, because the views of Madison and Jefferson
spawned the religion clauses they are necessary to a proper interpretation;
and, third, the Court believes that any connection between church and
state leads to social and political disharmony.20 While the accuracy of the
Court's view of history has been debated both on and off the Court,2 1 this
version has been generally accepted. 22 These conclusions have given rise
to two fundamental principles that drive the Court's analysis of the First
Amendment: separatism and voluntarism.
21
The concept of voluntarism may seem to support a coercion element
of the Establishment Clause. However, the idea attaches to the Free Exer-
cise Clause.2 4 Any compulsory recitation of religious beliefs necessarily
violates the religious freedoms of that clause. 25 The separatist view,
promulgated by Madison, more easily suits itself to the Establishment
Clause. This philosophy demands more than official separation of church
and state. Government behavior should not become enmeshed in religion
at any level.
26
Madison's view of separation embraced a philosophy not of coercion
but of exclusion. 2 7 Under this inquiry government actions violate the Es-
tablishment Clause when citizens in the religious minority have an inferior
status in society because of their beliefs. By keeping church and state com-
pletely separate, an individual's position in society is never compromised
because of his or her religious leanings. The Framers understood the ba-
sic psychological principle that effective democracy would be handicapped
20. Id. at 817-8; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 1-18. For a discussion of the development of
the theory see the majority opinions of Justice Black in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948), Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
21. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of consti-
tutional history.. . ."); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HIsToPicAL FACT
AND CURRENT FICTION 1-58 (1982); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Estab-
lishment, 27 WM & MARY L. REv. 933, 933 (1986).
22. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 818; see, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437-
43 (1961).
23. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 818.
24. See id.; see alsojames Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrruTION 82, 84 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) (discussing one's right to free exercise of religion).
25. See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim about Original In-
tent, 27 WM & MARY L. REv. 875, 922 (1986) (claiming "[i]f coercion is... an element of the
establishment clause, establishment adds nothing to free exercise").
26. See TRIBE, supra note 11, § 14-3, at 819. But see CORD, supra note 21, at 5 (espousing
separation of church and state only to the extent that would leave the states free to decide
"the matter of religious establishments or disestablishment").
27. Referring to a bill which would have allowed the collection of taxes to be used for
religious teachers, Madison stated:
It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do
not bend to those of the Legislative authority. Distant as it may be in its present
form from the Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step,
the other the last in the career of intolerance.
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5 THE FOUN-
DERS' CONsTrrTrION 82, 83 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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if some citizens felt excluded from society-no matter that the govern-
ment behavior may be entirely noncoercive.
28
The Framers intended a broad reading of the Establishment Clause.
29
Madison's view probably exceeded the Court's present interpretation of
the clause. He was against public funding for chaplains in either the mili-
tary or the legislature.3 0 Both of these practices have since been held con-
stitutional.3 1 Thomas Jefferson, while President, would not give
Thanksgiving Day proclamations partly because he believed they impli-
cated the religion clauses.3 2 If Jefferson disapproved of these essentially
noncoercive governmental acts, then it is logical to assume that he would
have disapproved of any state certification of religion.3 3 To Jefferson the
Establishment Clause proscribed "not simply state coercion, but also state
endorsement, of religious belief and observance."3 4 This view supports an
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that is based on exclusion.
While the debate over the Establishment Clause rages on,3 5 there is
enough evidence to support the proposition that the clause should be in-
terpreted broadly. Such a construction furthers the Framers' intent that
state endorsement of religion violates the clause regardless of whether the
governmental behavior is coercive. Nothing in history is so compelling to
demand a reevaluation of the clause3 6 where coercion takes on a disposi-
tive role.
28. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 n.10 (1992) (quoting SIGMUND FREUD,
GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 51 (1922) ("[A] religion, even if it calls
itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it.").
29. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2672 (Souter, J., concurring).
30. James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrrUON 103, 104
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
31. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (allowing legislative chaplains does not
violate the Establishment Clause); Katcoff v. Marsh. 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (allowing
military chaplains does not violate the Establishment Clause).
32. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 98, 98-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
33. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2674 (Souter, J., concurring).
34. Id.
35. A substantial debate exists on whether the Establishment Clause allows "nonprefer-
ential" aid. See LEONARD W. LEvy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 89, 111-14 (1986) (arguing
against nonpreferential aid but claiming the Framers did not recognize a difference between
preferential aid and non-preferential aid); Laycock, supra note 25, at 902-13 (arguing against
nonpreferential aid and believing the Framers knew the difference between nonpreferential
and preferential aid). But see Wallace v. Jaffree, 4'72 U.S. 38, 103 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that through the use of a treaty provision allowing public funding of a
priest and church for Indians the Establishment Clause allows nonpreferential aid); THOMAS
J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 207-15 (1986) (advancing the view that the Framers intended to allow nonpref-
erential aid although they did not know the difference between nonpreferential and prefer-
ential aid).




The Court first applied Establishment Clause analysis to a state law
3 7
in Everson v. Board of Education.3 8 This case incorporated the Establish-
ment Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
making it applicable to the states.3 9 The Court considered a New Jersey
statute that provided for reimbursement of funds spent by parents for pub-
lic transportation of their children to private-including parochial-
schools. 40 In deciding the statute did not violate the First Amendment,
4 1
the Court enunciated a fundamental principle of the Establishment
Clause. Government, be it state or federal, may not aid one religion, all
religions, or prefer one religion over another through its laws.
42
While the Court gave specific examples of prohibited government be-
havior,4 3 the opinions show the policies that drive the religion clauses gen-
erally and the Establishment Clause specifically. The religion clauses work
together to create a single profound freedom. 44 The reason for the Estab-
lishment Clause was to further this freedom by causing a complete separa-
tion between religion and the state by "comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion."45 The Court's focus on "sup-
port" or "aid" to religion was a necessarily broader interpretation of the
clause than a strict coercion analysis.
In the late forties and early fifties, the Court decided two cases involv-
ing religion in public schools. In Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion,46 the Court dealt with a system whereby a tax-supported public school
allowed private-sector teachers to teach courses in religion. 47 Although
the classes were voluntary, students who chose not to attend were required
to go to another part of the school to study secular topics. 48 At that time
Illinois had a compulsory education law that required children to attend
school while it was in session. 4 9 Here the Court applied a coercion analy-
sis because Illinois's compulsory education law aided the religious educa-
tion program.50 Students "compelled by law" to attend school were set
free from their legal obligation if they would attend religious classes.
5 1
37. There are some earlier cases regarding the Establishment Clause that dealt with fed-
eral laws. See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (building a hospital with public
funds did not violate the Establishment Clause despite the fact that Catholic nuns would run
it); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (applying the Clause to federal bigamy laws); Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (accepting Jefferson's concept that the Establish-
ment Clause constituted "a wall of separation between church and state").
38. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
39. Id. at 14-15.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 8-18.
42. Id. at 15.
43. See id. at 15-16.
44. See id. at 40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
46. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
47. Id. at 207.
48. Id. at 209.
49. Id. at 205.
50. Id. at 209.
51. Id. at 209-10.
1994]
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The Court found this practice unconstitutional because Illinois's compul-
sory education system provided the religion classes with their students.
5 2
In Zorach v. Clauson,53 the Court considered a program similar to the
one in McCollum The New York City program allowed public school stu-
dents to be released from school to receive religious education. 54 The
instruction took place outside of public school classrooms and did not
involve public spending.5 5 The Court found that the program was neu-
tral5 6 toward religion and, therefore, not coercive.5 7 In the Court's view a
contrary holding would not further the accommodation of religion al-
lowed by the First Amendment.58 Zorach differs from McCollum because
the New York program merely accommodated religion; the Illinois law, by
providing classrooms, actually aided religion. Until Lee59 these two cases
were the only examples where the Supreme Court based Establishment
Clause determinations upon the question of coercion.
The Court examined the constitutionality of prayer in public schools
for the first time in Engel v. Vitale.60 The Board of Education for New
Hyde Park, New York directed the school district's principal to have a
prayer read at the beginning of the school day.61 Although the prayer was
nonsectarian and participation was voluntary, the Court held the practice
violated the Establishment Clause.6 2 The majority opinion made clear the
principle that a showing of coercion was unnecessary to make an Establish-
ment Clause claim. 63 A coercion inquiry attaches to a Free Exercise
Clause analysis. 64 While recognizing that coercion may be involved in an
Establishment Clause violation, the Court stated that the Clause's protec-
tions encompass more than that.65 It recognized the Madisonian view that
religion and government are afforded greater prosperity when their affairs
52. See id. at 212.
53. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
54. Id. at 308.
55. Id. at 308-09.
56. The Court has decided other cases using the neutrality principle as the legitimate
opposite of coercion. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that the
Establishment Clause was violated because the state university permitted non-religious
groups to use its facilities while banning religious groups from using them). In response to
the Widmar decision, Congress passed The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988).
Under that Act, high schools receiving federal funding must allow religious groups to have
meetings outside of school hours if other groups have the same rights. Id. § 4071 (a)-(c).
The meetings must be "voluntary," "student-initiated," and done without "sponsorship... by
the school." Id. § 4071 (c)(1)-(2).
57. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 (1952).
58. See id. (reasoning that a contrary holding "would be preferring those who believe in
no religion over those who do believe").
59. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
60. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
61. Id. at 422.
62. Id. at 430.
63. Id. (noting that "[t]he Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to
coerce nonobserving individuals or not").
64. Id.
65. Id. at 431.
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are kept separate. 66 This case firmly stands for the proposition that coer-
cion is an unnecessary element to an Establishment Clause claim.
67
One year later the Court revisited the school prayer arena in School
District of Abington v. Schempp.68 Students began the school day with the
reading of ten verses of the Bible and a recitation of the Lord's prayer.
69
The Court summarized the test for an Establishment Clause violation as it
stood at that time: the purpose and the primary effect of the state action
must not advance or inhibit religion. 70 Because the prayer and Bible read-
ing equated to a state-sponsored religious ceremony, the Court held that
the primary effect was the advancement of religion that violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. 7 1 Also, the Court specifically stated that coercion is not
an element to an Establishment Clause claim. 7
2 In the context of school 73
prayer,74 Engel and Schempp are especially persuasive.
The test for a violation of the Establishment Clause became en-
trenched in Lemon v. Kurtzman.75 The Court considered a Pennsylvania
statute that funded nonpublic schools by reimbursing them for educa-
tional expenses, and a Rhode Island statute that gave nonpublic school
teachers a supplement equal to 15% of their annual salary.7 6 Both statutes
aided educational institutions associated with religion and were found un-
constitutional. 77 The Court settled on a three prong test:78 (1) the statute
in question must have a secular purpose; (2) the primary effect must not
advance or inhibit religion; and (3) the government must not become en-
tangled in religion. 79 If a statute or practice fails any one of these prongs,
66. Id. at 431 n.13.
67. But see McConnell, supra note 21, at 934-35 (arguing that the Court ignored prece-
dent, offered no explanation for its negation of a coercion element, and found the prayer
coercive anyway).
68. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id. at 222.
71. Id. at 223-24.
72. Id. at 223 (recognizing a distinction between the clauses: "a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not
be so attended").
73. The Court has considered Establishment Clause claims regarding the nature of the
curriculum in public schools. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that provided creationism be taught as well as evolution
because the statute was enacted solely for religious purposes); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968) (holding that the Arkansas law preventing the teaching of evolution violated the
Establishment Clause because it aided religion).
74. The Court has also held "moment of silence" statutes unconstitutional even though
no coercion was involved. See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding unconstitu-
tional an Alabama statute which called for a one minute peiord of silence beginning each
school day for voluntary prayer or meditation). Many states, however, still have moment of
silence statutes on the books. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.062 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-1050 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105 para. 20/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); INn. CODE ANN
§ 20-10.1-7-11 (Bums 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5308a (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-
1004 (1990).
75. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
76. Id. at 606-07.
77. Id. at 607.
78. Id. at 612-13.
79. Id. The entanglement prong was first promulgated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970).
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then it is unconstitutional. Of the thirty-one Establishment Clause cases
decided since Lemon, the Court has failed to use this test only once.
8 0
The case that did not rely upon the Lemon standards was Marsh v.
Chambers8 l. A chaplain, publicly financed, commenced each session of the
Nebraska Legislature with a prayer.8 2 The Court found this practice to be
constitutional. The Court relied on "history and tradition" in making its
finding.83 Combining this analysis with a neutrality test, the practice was
upheld because it was "nonsectarian," "nonproseltyzing," and did not pre-
fer one religion over another.8 4 The Court was persuaded by the fact
"civil" invocations are used extensively in this country by many public insti-
tutions.8 5 The Court also noted that there was less chance for coercion in
legislative prayer than in school prayer.8 6 Placed in proper perspective
this case is one narrow deviation in a long line of Supreme Court
precedent.
8 7
C. The Split in the Circuits
The Marsh decision created a split in the circuits. In Stein v. Plainwell
Community Schools,8 8 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on
Marsh and found that public school graduation prayers are not necessarily
unconstitutional.8 9 The court held that graduation prayers are unlike
classroom prayers but similar to the legislative and judicial prayers dis-
cussed in Marsh.90 The court also noted that graduation prayers offer less
chance for coercion than classroom prayers.9 1 While holding that gradua-
tion prayers were not necessarily proscribed by the First Amendment, the
80. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2663 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The
last Establishment Clause decision before Lee occurred in 1990. See Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-253 (1990) (plurality opinion) (analyzing the Equal Access Act
with the Lemon test). For authority that the Court may be interested in a test that asks
whether the government has endorsed religion, see Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1989) (plurality opinion).
81. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
82. Id. at 784.
83. Id. at 786.
84. Id. at 793 n.14.
85. Id. For a detailed discussion of the nature of civil religion see Yehudah Mirsky, Note,
Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 (1986).
86. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
87. Although this opinion is flawed for various reasons, the coercion aspect is contra-
dicted by precedent. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (public
schools may not "convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred"); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (state system of sending public
school teachers to parochial schools to teach secular subjects struck down despite lack of
coercion because it threatened to express state support for religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 72 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (reasoning that "[t]he decisions
in-[Engel and Schempp] acknowledged the coercion implicit under the statutory schemes, but
they expressly turned only on the fact that the government was sponsoring a manifestly reli-
gious exercise"); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786
(1973) (asserting that "proof of coercion ... [is] not a necessary element of any claim under
the Establishment Clause").
88. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 1408-09.




court held the specific prayers at issue to be unconstitutional because of
their sectarian nature.
92
In Weisman v. LeP the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected
the Stein court's reasoning.9 4 This holding put the First Circuit in direct
conflict with the Sixth Circuit as to the scope of Marsh and the constitu-
tionality of public school graduation prayers.
The split in the circuits set the stage for the Supreme Court's decision
in Lee v. Weisman.95 Since the adoption of the coercion test in Lee, a fed-
eral circuit court96 and a recent federal district court97 have each allowed
graduation prayers, basing their decision on the new test. These cases il-
lustrate the flaws of the coercion test.
II. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts
Before Lee, principals in the Providence, Rhode Island school system
were allowed to ask members of the clergy to offer invocation and bene-
diction prayers at the graduation ceremonies of middle and high school
students.98 In 1989, principal Robert E. Lee asked a rabbi to offer the
invocation and benediction at the graduation ceremony at Nathan Bishop
Middle School. Principal Lee provided the rabbi with a pamphlet entitled
"Guidelines for Civic Occasions." 99 The pamphlet recommended a style
of prayer that would reflect the sensitive nature of nonsectarian public
ceremonies. Along with the pamphlet the principal told the rabbi that the
prayers should be nonsectarian. 100
Prior to the ceremony Daniel Weisman, acting for himself and his
daughter Deborah, sought a temporary restraining order in federal district
court to prevent the inclusion of prayers at the graduation ceremony.
10 1
The court denied the motion. 10 2 On June 29, 1989, Deborah attended
her graduation accompanied by her family.10 3 Attendance at the cere-
mony was voluntary. 10 4 The prayers were said; they lasted not more than
two minutes.' 0 5 Daniel Weisman then filed an amended complaint seek-
92. Id. at 1410 (noting "[t]hey employ the language of Christian theology and prayer").
93. 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
94. Id. at 1096-97; see infra text accompanying notes 111-17.
95. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
96. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
97. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993).
98. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2653-54.
102. Id. at 2654.
103. Id. at 2653-54.
104. Id. at 2653.
105. Id. at 2653-54. For the complete language of the prayer see id. at 2652-53.
1994]
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ing a permanent injunction to prevent school officials of the Providence
public school system from including prayers at future graduations.
10 6
B. Lower Court Rulings
The district court granted the permanent injunction and held the
graduation prayers to be an unconstitutional violation of the First Amend-
ment.10 7 The court applied the three prong Lemon test.108 Finding that
the invocation and benediction practice failed to satisfy the second prong,
the court did not address the first and third prongs of the test.10 9 The
district court concluded that the prayers advanced religion by "creating an
identification of school with a deity, and therefore religion."110 The court
also stated its determination not to follow Stein v. Plainwell Community
Schools,11 1 which had relied on Marsh v. Chambers.
11 2
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant a per-
manent injunction in favor of Weisman.113 Judge Torruella, writing the
majority opinion, adopted the district court's opinion.'1 4 Judge Bownes,
in his concurring opinion, concluded that the graduation prayers failed all
three prongs of the Lemon test. 1 ' Judge Bownes also questioned the Stein
decision and found it unpersuasive. 116 Judge Campbell filed a dissenting
opinion based on Marsh and Stein.' 17 With this decision the First Circuit
placed itself in direct conflict with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Stein.
C. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court in Lee
v. Weisman.118 The Court concluded that the religious exercises per-
formed at the graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. 119 The opinion was based on the school prayer
cases1 20 and the belief that adolescents are susceptible to peer pressure.
1 2 1
The Court interpreted these cases to forbid the state from compelling par-
ticipation in a religious exercise.
12 2
The Court began by reciting the specific facts that controlled the deci-
sion. State officials directed a religious exercise at a graduation cere-
106. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 70 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir.
1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
107. Id. at 75.
108. Id. at 71.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 72.
111. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
112. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
113. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct 2649 (1992).
114. Id. at 1090.
115. Id. at 1094-95.
116. Id. at 1096.
117. Id. at 1097-99 (Campbell,J, dissenting).
118. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
119. Id. at 2661.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2659.
122. Id. at 2661.
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mony.' 23 While attendance was voluntary, student participation in the
religious exercise was essentially mandatory.' 24 Because of these facts the
Court determined that it could decide the case based on the precedents of
the school prayer cases.1 25 Therefore, the Court concluded that is was
unnecessary to apply or reconsider the test from Lemon v. Kurtzman.
1 2 6
The Court then addressed the state's involvement in the religious ex-
ercise. 12 7 The principal decided to include prayers, selected a member of
the clergy, and dictated the content of the prayer.' 28 This was accom-
plished by providing the rabbi with the copy of "Guidelines for Civic Occa-
sions" and by advising him that the prayers should be nonsectarian. In the
Court's view these actions were attributable to the state.' 29 While discuss-
ing the state's involvement, the Court dispelled any arguments that would
recognize nonsectarian prayer as legitimate under the Establishment
Clause. 1
30
The court then examined the issue from the student's perspective.
Citing Engel v. Vitale' 3 ' and School District v. Schempp,13 2 the Court ex-
plained that prayer exercises in public schools are particularly likely to
cause indirect coercion. Because students were under public and peer
pressure to stand or maintain a respectful silence, the Court found the
prayers to be an example of the state coercing participation in a religious
exercise.'
3 3
The Court's decision was unaffected by the de minimus character of
the prayers. 134 The Court was also unconvinced by the petitioners' (the
school board and the United States filed a brief as amicus curiae) 13 5 asser-
tion that there was no coercion because attendance at the ceremony was
voluntary. A teenage student has no real choice not to attend one of the
most important occasions of a person's life.'
36
The Court then distinguished Marsh v. Chambers.13 7 Noting the fact-
sensitive nature of Establishment Clause analysis,' 38 the Court found a
graduation ceremony to be different than a legislative session. At legisla-
tive sessions, adults were free to come and go, while a graduation cere-
mony, a significant event in one's life, is conducted with more formality,
123. Id. at 2655.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
127. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
128. Id. at 2655-56.
129. Id. at 2655.
130. Id. at 2656.
131. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
132. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
133. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
134. Id. at 2659.
135. Id. at 2653.
136. Id. at 2659.
137. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
138. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
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giving students less freedom to leave if they wish. 139 The Court concluded
by stating that not every state action involving religion is invalid.
D. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Stevens
andJustice O'Connor joined. 140 Justice Blackmun applied the Lemon test
to the graduation prayers at issue and found they failed the first two
prongs of the test.14 1 Justice Blackmun then proceeded to show why coer-
cion is not a necessary element to an Establishment Clause claim. First, he
cited Supreme Court precedent that refuted the idea.1 42 Second, he ana-
lyzed the purpose of the Clause through Constitutional history and case
precedent. Citing James Madison, he emphasized the exclusion felt by
those in the minority when the government endorses a particular religious
group. 14 3 Third, he expressed the importance of the separation between
church and state. Justice Blackmun concluded by stating that these princi-
ples, combined with Supreme Court precedent, prohibit government en-
dorsement, sponsorship, or involvement with religion regardless of
whether coercion is involved.
144
Justice Souter filed a concurrence in which Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor joined. 145 Justice Souter also analyzed the history of the Estab-
lishment Clause and the relevant Supreme Court precedent to illustrate
that coercion is not a relevant aspect of the Clause. He noted the First
Amendment also contains the Free Exercise Clause.1 46 That Clause con-
tains the coercion element. Any law that coerces support or participation
in a religious exercise would violate the Free Exercise Clause. 147 If coer-
cion were part of the Establishment Clause, then the Establishment Clause
would add nothing to the Free Exercise Clause. Using constitutional his-
tory, Justice Souter urged that the Framers meant the Establishment
Clause to add something to the Constitution. 48 He confirmed that
Supreme Court precedent follows this principle.
149
E. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice White, and Justice Thomas joined. 150 Justice Scalia's heated
dissent began by referring to tradition and history. He argued that non-
sectarian prayer at public celebrations was such an entrenched tradition
139. Id. at 2660.
140. Id. at 2661.
141. Id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 2664-65.
143. Id. at 2665-66.
144. Id. at 2667.
145. Id.




150. Id. at 2678 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that it could not violate the Establishment Clause.1 5 1 Next, Justice Scalia
stated that the real flaw in the Court's opinion was using the version of the
coercion test promulgated by the majority. 152 In his view the Establish-
ment Clause forbids the state from coercing participation in a religious
exercise. However, governmental actions should only be classified as coer-
cive if they are backed by a threat of legal (not psychological) penalty.
153
Justice Scalia distinguished the school prayer cases by arguing that
those decisions stemmed from a legal coercion to go to school.1 54 He
concluded by disparaging the Lemon test and claiming that the expulsion
of that test may have been the one worthy aspect of the decision. 155 Jus-
tice Scalia noted that under the coercion test school prayer would still be
able to take place. School officials need only make some announcement
that no one is compelled to join in the prayers and standing would not
necessarily signify participation. 15 6 As a final note, Justice Scalia argued
that nonsectarian prayers serve a unifying function and should have been
accommodated because a majority of the community desired them and
the inconvenience to the non-believer was minimal.
157
III. ANALYSIS
A. Flaws in the Lee Decision and the Coercion Test
The United States' brief tried to convince the Supreme Court that Lee
v. Weisman158 was not merely a disagreement about the extent of the
Marsh exception to Lemon.159 Instead, the United States, in support of the
petitioner school board, filed a brief calling for Lemon to be overruled.
160
The United States claimed that only state practices coercing religious par-
ticipation or belief can violate the Establishment Clause.
16 1
A majority of the Court was convinced. Mthough the court did not
expressly overrule Lemon, it failed to use the test despite its applicability.
The majority did, however, find the coercion analysis to be the fundamen-
tal inquiry with an Establishment Clause claim. The Court ultimately
found the prayers unconstitutional, but they could have arrived at the
same result using Lemon or accurately applying school prayer precedent.
These methods would have advanced the true goal of the Establishment
Clause-the protection against exclusion. The Court would have struck
a proper balance between the religion clauses.
151. Id. at 2678-79.
152. Id. at 2683.
153. Id. at 2684.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2685.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2686.
158. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
159. Russell M. Mortyn, The Rehnquist Court and the New Establishment Clause, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 567, 585 (1992).
160. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, 20, Weisman v.
Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1014), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (hereinafter
Brief for United States).
161. See Brief for United States at 20-28.
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The petitioners lost this battle, but by convincing the Court to adopt a
coercion standard they moved a long way toward winning the war. This is
born out by recent federal circuit and district court decisions that illus-
trate the flaws in the coercion -test. During this writing the Supreme Court
also ruled in such a way as to magnify those flaws.1
62
The Court could have found the prayers unconstitutional without
adopting a coercion standard. The district court and the circuit court
both found the prayers unconstitutional without leaving the confines of
the Lemon test. Offering a prayer with the word "God" in it has a religious
purpose. That a prayer was given by a member of the clergy at the request
of a state official unquestionably has the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion. By choosing the speaker and directing the content of the prayer, the
state became excessively entangled with religion. The invocations and
benedictions failed all three prongs of the Lemon test. It was unnecessary
for the Court to adopt a coercion standard to reach its conclusion.
Using the Lemon test would have been more faithful to the goals of
the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause is violated whenever
a person's citizenship is devalued because he or she is in the religious
minority. That person is pushed toward the fringes of society because he
or she is not part of the religious elite. It is this exclusion against which
the Establishment Clause is meant to guard. 163 The Framers, especially
James Madison, understood this principle. By allowing a coercion stan-
dard to be so important an inquiry, the Court has distanced itself from the
Framers' interpretation of the Clause.
By using a coercion test the Court misapplied its own precedent. The
majority opinion relied heavily on Engle v. Vitale16 4 and School District v.
Schenpp.16 5 Both of these cases,.however, stand for the proposition that
proof of coercion is unnecessary to an Establishment Clause claim. 166
Even though the Court did not apply Lemon, a proper application of these
two cases would have achieved the same result had the majority been more
faithful to the essence of the Establishment Clause. When the state en-
dorses religion by sponsoring school prayer, the fundamental dilemma is
not that students are forced to participate. Instead, the problem lies with
the state's systematic exclusion of those students who do not hold the
State's beliefs or who refuse to participate in its exercise.
When the rabbi offered the invocation and benediction at the request
of Principal Lee, the state endorsed religion. In doing so, the state told
Deborah Weisman that her rights and beliefs were not as cherished as
162. SeeJones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
163. See generally The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HAv. L. REv. 163, 259-
69 (1992) (discussing the exclusion principle in relation to the Establishment Clause and
Lee).
164. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
165. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
166. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 430; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
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those who approved of the prayer. 16 7 That was why the Establishment
Clause was violated. Such an analysis is consistent with school prayer pre-
cedent and the intent of the Establishment Clause. By adopting the coer-
cion test the Court has distanced itself from its own precedent as well as
the Framers' intent. The result is alienation from the basic principle that
the Establishment Clause protects citizens from exclusion.
By using Lemon or properly applying school prayer precedent, the
Court would have maintained the separate identity of the two religion
clauses. Coercion is an element of the Free Exercise Clause-not the Es-
tablishment Clause. 168 By making an Establishment Clause claim rest on
the existence of coercion, the Court has reduced the need for the Clause.
The Court has made the Establishment Clause a shadow of the Free Exer-
cise Clause.
Instead of using Lemon or accurately applying school prayer prece-
dent, the Court adopted the coercion test. It is important to examine the
flaws of this test, because there is evidence that the Court is unhappy with
Lemon. 169 It may decide to completely abandon Lemon in favor of the coer-
cion test. There are two fundamental problems with the coercion test.
1 70
First, the coercion test is result-oriented. A court may easily manipu-
late the test to produce a desired outcome. This has been illustrated by
two cases decided since Lee. In Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Dis-
trict,1 7 1 the court held the graduation prayers in question to be constitu-
tional. 172 The key distinction in Jones was that public high school seniors
could select a senior to deliver nonsectarian prayers at their graduation
ceremonies. 173 It should be noted that the court held that the prayers
passed the Lemon test. 174 However, if the Supreme Court had properly
found the prayers in Lee to be unconstitutional due to Lemon, the circuit
court would have had binding precedent that graduation prayers cannot
pass the Lemon test. The circuit court's misuse of the Lemon test magnifies
the error created by the Supreme Court's failure to use that test in Lee.
The most significant aspect of Jones is the court's manipulation of the
coercion test. The court held that the prayers were not coercive because a
majority of the students voted for the prayers. 175 The court could have
found that the prayers were coercive. There is just as much opportunity
for peer pressure in a student election as at a graduation ceremony. The
court found no coercion, however, because a person attending graduation
"should not be surprised to find the event affected by community stan-
167. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1113, 1168 (1988).
168. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
169. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. For a discussion of other problems with the test see Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. Ray.
555, 576-80 (1991).
171. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), ce7. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
172. Id. at 965.
173. Id. at 964.
174. Id. at 966-68.
175. See id. at 969-72.
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dards." 17 6 The court found no coercion because it wanted to reach a re-
sult that would satisfy-the majority of the community. This case is not an
aberration. In May 1993, in Harris v. Joint School District,177 a federal dis-
trict court upheld the constitutionality of a program similar to the one in
Jones by relying upon the Fifth Circuit's rationale.
178
These holdings give rise to the second problem with the coercion test.
The test is an instrument that can be used by the majority to control the
community. In Jones and Harris, both courts emphasized that if a majority
of the students vote for the graduation prayers the coercion is removed
and the prayers are constitutional. Based on that reasoning, a state could
decide to adopt Christianity as the official state religion if a majority of the
population voted for it. This example may seem extreme but it differs
from the recent federal court holdings only in degree, not in kind.
Finding a practice constitutional because the majority approves of it
violates the whole concept of democracy. The true test of a democracy is
how it treats the least influential of its citizens. 179 The coercion test, as
illustrated by the federal court holdings, shows an utter disregard for the
beliefs and sensitivities of the religious minority. The test gives the major-
ity the means to banish the minority from the privileges of society. The
government endorses these actions by approving of prayer at graduation
ceremonies. By endorsing this behavior the state tells the minority that
their rights are not valued. The Establishment Clause is meant to protect
against this type of exclusion. During this writing the Supreme Court es-
sentially approved of this behavior by denying certiorari to Jones.1 8 0 The
Court told the rest of the country that the rationale in Jones is
constitutional.
The two federal court holdings since Lee and the denial of certiorari
to Jones show the implications of the coercion test. It is unlikely that these
two cases will be isolated incidents. All over the country students and
schools are attempting to have prayers in their graduation ceremonies. 18 1
If those in favor of prayer in each community are in the majority, then
prayer will occur. Justice Scalia's dissent, which predicted that graduation
prayers would still take place, seems prophetic. 182 The prayers will hap-
pen based on the principle of majority rule, while the Constitution will be
conveniently ignored.
B. The Fundamental Conflict
The conflict between majority rule and the authority of the Constitu-
tion pervades the concept of democracy. The power of the majority to
176. Id. at 972.
177. 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993).
178. Id. at 643.
179. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
180. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950
(1993).
181. Larry Witham, Schools Get Around Court's Ban on Prayer, WASH. TIMES, May 22, 1993, at
Al.
182. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,-2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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shape a democratic society seems rudimentary. Historically, tyranny re-
sulted from the few controlling the many, the poor being "sacrificed to the
rich."1 83 To evade this elitist paradigm, democracy demands that the peo-
ple make decisions about issues regarding their personal rights. Arguably,
putting any limits upon the power of the majority forms a type of elitist
-paternalism that contradicts the nature of republican government. Alter-
natively, by giving the majority unfettered decision-making powers, the
government subjects society to a vigilantism as harmful as any totalitarian
power.
The role of the Constitution as the check against majoritarian tyranny
raises equally serious issues. If the Constitution is imbued with such power
that it cannot be changed by the will of the majority, then it exemplifies
the ultimate form of elitism. The people cannot be trusted with authority.
If, on the other hand, majoritarian forces could vote to disband any or all
constitutional rights, then a minority member's position in society is tenu-
ous. The decisions in Lee and Jones illustrate the need to consider an im-
portant question: whether majority rule is the cornerstone of democracy
or the legal justification of tyranny? As Lee and Jones suggest, can a major-
ity vote to abandon a constitutional safeguard?
A basic principle of a republican form of government is that the ma-
jority is the best protector of both public and private goals.' 8 4 The U.S.
Constitution promulgates such a view. Before the Constitution may be
amended, specific majority criteria must be met to insure a proper "Mode
of Ratification."18 5 However, Framers such as Thomas Jefferson viewed
the Constitution as a baseline which could not be transcended.' 8 6 The
Constitution acts as fundamental, unchangeable law. 187 It may be altered,
however, by an express statement of the majority. 188 The Colorado Con-
stitution expressly vests power in the people, 189 who may change the gov-
ernment unless it is "repugnant to the constitution of the United
183. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 410, 413
(1969).
184. See id. at 410.
185. U.S. CONST. art. V. The pertinent part of Article V reads as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....
Id.
186. See Kenneth W. Thompson, Religion and Politics in the United States: An Overview, 483
ANNALs AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (1986).
187. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme Law of the Land
."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ([W]ritten constitutions [are]
contemplate[d] . . . as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation...
WooD, supra note 183, at 281.
188. See WooD, supra note 183, at 281.
189. COLO. CONsT. art. II, § I ("All political power is vested in and derived from the
people; all government, of right, originates from the people, is founded upon their will only,
and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.").
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States."19 ° Ambiguous results occur from the friction between the power
of the majority and the authority of the Constitution.
When directly confronted with these issues the Supreme Court claims
to side with the Constitution. As the Court stated, "[o]ne's right to life,
liberty, and property... and other fundamental rights may not be submit-
ted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 19 1 The Colo-
rado Supreme Court echoed this position during the recent litigation over
Amendment 2's prohibition of protected status to homosexuals, lesbians,
or bisexuals. 192 These stands for the minority are appropriate responses
by the judiciary. The federal judiciary in particular possesses a "political
insularity" due to life tenure that makes it an important instrument in
checking the political majority' 9 3-a role mandated by the
Constitution. 1
94
The Court has turned away from an aggressive enforcement of the
Establishment Clause. 195 It has succumbed to the "principles of popular
sovereignty."1 9 6 This acquiescence equates to a reluctance to check the
majority.197 This transfer of authority means that bureaucrats will enforce
the will of the majority making the crucial decisions regarding religion.
198
190. Id. art. II, § 2. The section reads as follows:
The people of this state have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves,
as a free, sovereign, and independent state; and to alter and abolish their constitu-
tion and form of government whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety
and happiness, provided, such change be not repugnant to the constitution of the
United States.
Id.
191. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964) (asserting "[a] citizen's constitutional
rights can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be").
Decisions by the Court in the arena of individual participation in the political process are
numerous. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holding Ohio election laws
unconstitutional because minority political parties were denied equal protection); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that an individual's right to vote may not be diluted);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding legislative apportionment issues justiciable).
These decisions comport with the basic notion that "[i
] t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Also, it
should be noted that almost half of the amendments to the Constitution since 1791 deal with
participation in the political process. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (dictating the procedure
for electing the President and Vice-President); id. amend. XV (prohibiting the denial of vot-
ing rights based upon race, color, or previous condition of servitude); id. amend. XVII (pro-
viding the ability to vote directly for United States Senators); id. amend. XIX (providing the
vote to women); id. amend, XXIII (providing the vote to District of Columbia residents); id.
amend. XXIV (banning the poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (providing the vote to eighteen-year-
olds).
192. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (1993) (citing both Barnette and Lucas
although noting that the Amendment's passage by a majority of voters mandated "great def-
erence"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
193. Daniel 0. Conkle, God Loveth Adverbs, 42 DEPAUL L. Rv. 339, 343 (1992); see also
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
194. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
195. Conkle, supra note 193, at 339.





In the graduation prayer context weighty constitutional issues will be de-
cided by school administrators and, after Jones, by high school students. 199
By delegating its core function, the Court violates the principle of
separation of powers. The legislative branch provides a vehicle through
which the majority's voice may be heard. The judicial branch checks the
potential excesses of the majoritarian legislative branch. The judicial
branch exists to insure the interests of the minority. When the judiciary
abdicates this duty, the majoritarian forces are free to trample the rights of
the minority. Usually, this stems from an unchecked legislature. In an
Establishment Clause context, the Court's mistaken delegation of deci-
sion-making power results in constitutional rights that are even more frag-
ile than those under an unchecked legislature. By transferring
constitutional decisions to school administrators and students, the Court
delegates power to entities that lack the authority to consider these mat-
ters. The Court delegates to entities that either lack subject matter exper-
tise or who are private parties.
Members of the legislature are elected. They represent an added
layer between the citizen majority and the laws that the legislature passes.
While this majoritarian hierarchy creates a danger of tyranny based upon
popularity, it does not foster the potential for abuse that delegation di-
rectly to citizenry does. The general population, unencumbered by even
the slightest procedural safeguards, reigns free. The majority, shrouded in
the legitimacy of its own existence,2 00 creates or dismisses rights as it
pleases. By abandoning its duty to protect minority rights the Court tacitly
199. See id. (arguing that academics can participate in this process by at least educating
the decision-makers so that they are "apprised of the competing considerations"). Arguably,
a disparaging view of high school students making constitutional decisions exemplifies pater-
nal elitism. To many people, students included, "[r]eligion speaks truth, both inwardly and
outwardly. It tells believers who they are and where they stand." Id. at 344. However, the
Court, by virtue of its position in government and the education of its members, is meant to
make constitutional decisions. It rests above competing interests free to make objective,
knowledgeable decisions. While it would be naive to suggest that the Court exudes objectiv-
ity during every legal consideration, believing that school administrators or high students are
in any better position to decide these sensitive issues trivializes the Constitution.
200. Legitimacy considerations underlie any concept of government. Majority rule ap-
peals to most advocates of democracy because of its apparent legitimacy. If government sup-
ports the most popular beliefs, then it seems to act with the people's consent. Governing
with the consent of the governed characterizes legitimacy. To create this appearance of legit-
imacy, governments seek to obtain a majority. Historically, some governments muscle their
way into power and then claim a majority. In Germany during the 1930's Adolf Hitler seized
power through, among other things, an Enabling Act that provided the Chancellor with the
ability to promulgate laws that violated the constitution. WILLIAM L. SHiRER, THE RiSE AND
FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 229 (1960). On August 19, 1934, 90 per cent of the German
people voted to approve Hitler's control of absolute power. Id. at 229-30. Once empowered
to act on behalf of the majority, Hitler "legitimately" passed the Nuremberg Laws of Septem-
ber 15, 1935, which stripped Jews of their citizenship, outlawed marriage and extramarital
relations between Jews and Aryans, and banned Jews from hiring female Aryans under thirty-
five years of age as servants. Id. at 233.
For further discussions of the relationships between totalitarian governments and the
church see Zdzislawa Walaszek, An Open Issue of Legitimacy: The State and the Church in Poland,
483 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCL 118 (1986); Philip Walters, The Russian Orthodox
Church and the Soviet State, 483 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL & SOC. SCL 135 (1986). For an illustra-
tion of the extreme actions a "legitimized" law can produce see Murray Sayle, Closing the File
on flight 007, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 13, 1993, at 90, 95 (discussing two Soviet laws which,
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consents to the majoritarian tyranny. The government gives its stamp of
approval to the popular religious views. This empowers the majority all
the more. Those holding minority religious views are alienated and hu-
miliated. 20 1 This exclusion violates the Establishment Clause.
C. The Majoritarian Tradition in the United States
The democratic tradition in the United States stems from the basic
concept that power is vested in the people. 20 2 The people are, therefore,
free to shape their government. 20 3 Without the people's consent, laws are
invalid and illegitimate.20 4 If a majority votes for a law or acquiesces to
certain conduct, then it is legitimized. When the majority's will is fol-
lowed, justice and fairness are presumed.
This theme pervaded the formation of law in new communities
throughout the expansion of America. 20 5 During the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury as people poured west, transient communities formed based upon the
concept of majority rule. 20 6 This vigilantism did not displace established
institutions.2 0 7 Rather, it created courts and government where before
none existed. 20 8 Even the decisions to be governed by moral standards
were based upon majoritarian principles. 20 9 Possibly because of this
moral homogeneity, these communities led fairly orderly existences. 2 10
Recognition of the flaws of majority rule appeared early in American
history. During the first session of the House of Representatives, James
Madison stated, "the great danger lies not in the Executive, but in the
great body of the people-in the disposition which the majority always
read together, almost mandated shooting down Korean Airlines' Flight 007, which killed
hundreds of innocent people).
201. See Richard S. Kay, The Canadian Constitution and the Dangers of Establishment, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 361, 367-68 (1992); see also Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment
Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 373,379 (1992) (arguing "[g]overnment observance of the majority
religion does indeed tell religious minorities that they are outsiders and not fully accepted
members of the community").
202. Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 11, 12 (Helen
E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (saying "all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived
from the people").
203. Id. at 11-12 (asserting that "the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and inde-
feasible right to reform or change their government").
204. See Woon, supra note 183, at 162.
205. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BooRSTIN, THE AMERscANs: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 81-90
(1965) (discussing vigilantism and majority rule as the natural law of the transient communi-
ties of the mid-nineteenth century).
206. See id. at 81-82.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 82. "'We needed no law,' wrote an old pioneer of the mining camps, 'until
the lawyers came.' " Id. at 84.
210. See id. at 85.
Unguarded property was generally safe. In most mining camps a washbasinful of
gold dust could be left on a table in an open tent while the owners were far out of
sight working their claims. Though there were no police, provisions and tools were
seldom stolen. Theft, murder, and all kinds of violence were rare.
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discovers, to bear down, and depress the minority."2 1 1 Alexis De Toc-
queville, who spent a brief nine months in the United States between
1831-32,212 wrote extensively on the tyranny of the majority.2 13 He argued
that the majority possesses the traits of an individual who has absolute
power.2 14 The majority can misuse its power in the same fashion as the
individual.2 15 In the face of this abuse an aggrieved member of a minority
lacks redress to any but the majority.2 16 De Tocqueville cites both
Madison and Jefferson to support his proposition that the real danger in
the United States is the "Omnipotence of the Majority."2 17 These theorists
understood the fragile nature of a minority member's fundamental rights
under majority rule.
Thomas Jefferson viewed the Bill of Rights as necessary for "the legal
check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary."2 18 As an independent
branch removed from majoritarian influences, the judiciary exists to pro-
tect the rights of the minority. By surrendering this duty in its Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence, the Court betrays and abandons the alienated
member of the religious minority.
D. The Religious Sector Contrasted with Other Factions
Abolishing the whole idea of majority rule would justify a type of feu-
dalism known in Europe from 1500-1800.219 A small percentage of people
211. Gazette of the United States (June 10, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 64, 67
(Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). Evidence of Madison's awareness of the potential for
majoritarian tyranny appears in his letters and essays.
"Wherever the real power in a Government lies," [Madison] told Jefferson, "there is
danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in
which the Government is a mere instrument of the major number of constituents."
The people, it seemed, were as capable of despotism as any prince; public liberty
was no guarantee after all of private liberty.
WOOD, supra note 183, at 410.
212. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 9 (Richard D. Heffner ed., New
American Library 1956) (1835).
213. Id. (recognizing that "the book's central theme... [is] the tyranny of the majority in
the United States"). Heffner, himself, notes the stubbornness of the belief that majority rule
insuresjustice. "[T]he most pervasive myth to dominate American political thinking has been
our rather naive-and mistaken-equation of equality with freedom, of democracy (or ma-
jority rule) with liberty." Id. at 9-10.
214. See TocQUEviLLE, supra note 212, at 114.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 115.
When an individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to whom can he
apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the majority; if to
the legislature, it represents the majority, and implicitly obeys it; if to the executive
power, it is appointed by the majority, and serves as a passive tool in its hands. The
public force consists of the majority under arms; the jury is the majority invested
with the right of hearing judicial cases; and in certain States, even the judges are
elected by a majority. However iniquitous or absurd the measure of which you com-
plain, you must submit to it as well as you can.
Id.
217. See id. at 120-21.
218. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RGHTs, 218 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
219. SeeJ. M. ROBERTS, THE PELICAN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 524-25 (1987).
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would possess most of the land, wealth, and power. 220 Fundamental no-
tions of democracy entail some form of power vested in the people. To
deny the largest portion of society a voice in the political and social pro-
cess ignores an essential element of republican government. While some
areas of society may allow for majority rule, others should not.
22 1
Decisions on governmental policy must be made.22 2 A democracy
gives that decision-making power to the majority.223 Because decisions
need to be made on these matters, it is appropriate that the majority
makes them.2 24 This effectively uses majority rule to further republican
government. Decisions on religious matters, however, do not need to be
made by the government.22 5 When the government makes such rulings, it
tells society what the proper religion is.22 6 Citizens who do not espouse
the government's beliefs are "a little bit un-American."
227
Strong emotional and ideological attitudes characterize religious be-
liefs. Multitudes of views span the spectrum of religious thought.
22 8
Whether or not one believes in "God," how one chooses to worship or not
worship, is intensely personal. When government forces its religious views
on society by acquiescing to the majority belief, it invades one's innermost
concept of identity. "Human beings cannot endure emptiness and desola-
tion; they will fill the vacuum by creating a new focus of meaning."229 The
Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence allows government to
"fill the vacuum," a task best left to the individual.
E. An Aggressive View of the Establishment Clause
One commentator argues that the Supreme Court lacks sympathy for
religion 230 and questions why religion cannot persuade society. 231 Such
220. See id.
221. See Ira C. Lupu, Models of Church-State Interaction and the Strategy of the Religion Clauses,
42 DEPAuL L. REV. 223, 228 (1992) (asserting that "[tihe Framers, however, obviously
thought-and many contemporary Americans continue to believe-that religious factions
represent a different kind of phenomenon than political parties or other kinds of
associations").
222. Laycock, supra note 201, at 379-80.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 380.
226. Id.
227. Id.
There is no need for the government to make decisions about Christian rituals ver-
sus Jewish rituals versus no religious rituals at all. For government to make that
choice is simply a gratuitous statement about the kind of people we really are. By
making such statements, the government says the real American religion is watered-
down Christianity, and everybody else is a little bit un-American.
Id.
228. For a discussion of different religious relationships see WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (Macmillan Publishing Co. 1961) (1902). The author notes that
"[t] he divine can mean no single quality, it must mean a group of qualities, by being champi-
ons of which in alternation, different... [persons] may all find worthy missions." Id. at 378-
79.
229. KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF Con 399 (1994).




an argument ignores the inherent dangers involved with the mix of
church and state.23 2 To avoid these dangers the Establishment Clause
"implies the affirmative 'establishment' of a civil order for the resolution
of public moral disputes."233 Society agreed upon the "secular mecha-
nism" so religious battles would be avoided.
23 4
Majoritarians likely argue that much is being made over a small mat-
ter. A non-sectarian prayer is inconsequential, especially when supported
by the majority.2 35 This attitude furthers an ignorance of minority views.
Ignorance breeds intolerance. To provide proper protection to the mi-
nority, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted such that constitu-
tional protections are not left to the popular opinion of eighteen-year-
olds. The Clause acts as a barrier that prevents the government's dissemi-
nation of religious views through tacit approval of the majority will. By not
taking an aggressive stance, the Court allows that barrier to erode, forcing
the minority to accept alien beliefs.
CONCLUSION
In Lee the Supreme Court went against the Framers' intent and its
own precedent by adopting a coercion test to determine Establishment
Clause violations. A broad interpretation would properly hold that state
actions violate the Establishment Clause when they endorse religion,
whether those actions are coercive or not. Supreme Court precedent has
consistently held that coercion is not an element of an Establishment
Clause claim.
The Court could have arrived at the same result in Lee by using other
tests. These methods would have been more faithful to the true goal of
the Establishment Clause, which is the protection against exclusion. The
coercion test is flawed because it does not protect this goal.
The test is also result-oriented, and it furthers the concept of majority
rule. Majority rule, while fundamental to democracy, may threaten the
rights of the minority. By allowing crucial constitutional decisions to be
made by non-judiciary entities, the Court abandons its role as protector of
the minority. To insure constitutional safeguards, the Establishment
Clause should be aggressively interpreted. Based upon recent develop-
ments, however, it appears that graduation prayers will be allowed if a ma-
jority approves of them, regardless of any constitutional prohibitions.
Brook Millard
231. See Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 220 (1992).
232. See Lupu, supra note 221, at 224 ("First, disputes between the state and agents of
religion frequently result in dangers for religious liberty, and second, such disputes may also
threaten injury to the state's legitimate purposes.").
233. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 195, 197
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234. Id.
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